

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	President Clinton to John Conahan [partial] (1 page)	4/24/2000	P6/b(6)
002. letter	Troop 335 to Presidential Support [partial] (1 page)	4/10/2000	P6/b(6)
003. email	Maureen Shea to Woynab Wondwossen, re: letter to Bassam Estwani (1 page)	3/31/2000	P5
004. email	Maureen Shea to Mary Cahill, re: President's Request (1 page)	3/13/2000	P5
005. email	Maureen Shea to Woynab Wondwossen, re: letter to Bassam Estwani (2 pages)	4/5/2000	P5
006. letter	Bassam Estwani to President Clinton (3 pages)	3/10/2000	P5
007. letter	President Clinton to Laura Meredith Quicksilver [partial] (1 page)	4/25/2000	P6/b(6)
008. letter	President Clinton to Julia Brett Deixler [partial] (1 page)	4/25/2000	P6/b(6)
009. letter	President Clinton to Gregg Eli Marmaro [partial] (1 page)	4/25/2000	P6/b(6)
010. email	John Emerson to Ann Marie [partial] (1 page)	4/21/2000	P6/b(6)
011. form	Presidential Acknowledgement Letter, re: Deixler [partial] (1 page)	4/21/2000	P6/b(6)
012. form	Presidential Acknowledgement Letter, re: Quicksilver [partial] (1 page)	4/21/2000	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Records Management (OP)
AF
OA/Box Number: 14801

FOLDER TITLE:

418795

Whitney Ross
2006-1000-F
wr596

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. form	Presidential Acknowledgement Letter, re: Marmaro [partial] (1 page)	4/21/2000	P6/b(6)
014. letter	President Clinton to Stephanie Frost [partial] (1 page)	4/25/2000	P6/b(6)
015. form	Staff Request for Presidential Acknowledgement Letter, re: Frost [partial] (1 page)	11/8/1999	P6/b(6)
016. letter	President Clinton to Michael Anthony DeLisa [partial] (1 page)	4/25/2000	P6/b(6)
017. announcement	Graduation of Michael Anthony DeLisa [partial] (2 pages)	n.d.	P6/b(6)
018. form	Staff Request for Presidential Acknowledgement Letter, re: Trinko [partial] (1 page)	4/14/2000	P6/b(6)
019. letter	President Clinton to Mary Carol Marotta [partial] (1 page)	4/26/2000	P6/b(6)
020. letter	President Clinton to Antoniette Porretta [partial] (1 page)	4/3/2000	P6/b(6)
021. paper	2000 Duncan Nixon Volunteer Award, re: Porretta [partial] (1 page)	3/6/2000	P6/b(6)
022. paper	2000 Duncan Nixon Volunteer Award, re: Marotta [partial] (1 page)	3/6/2000	P6/b(6)
023. letter	President Clinton to Antoniette Porretta [partial] (1 page)	4/26/2000	P6/b(6)
024. bio	Constance Mary Jennings (1 page)	n.d.	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Records Management (OP) -
AF
OA/Box Number: 14801

FOLDER TITLE:

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Whitney Ross
2006-1000-F
wr596

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
025. letter	President Clinton to Nicholas Martone [partial] (1 page)	4/26/2000	P6/b(6)
026. letter	James Carlson to President Clinton [partial] (1 page)	2/8/2000	P6/b(6)
027. letter	President Clinton to Sara Fishbach [partial] (1 page)	4/28/2000	P6/b(6)
028. form	Presidential Acknowledgement Letter, re: Fishbach [partial] (1 page)	3/22/2000	P6/b(6)
029. letter	President Clinton to Ben Ifshin [partial] (1 page)	4/28/2000	P6/b(6)
030. letter	Ifshins to President Clinton [partial] (1 page)	4/3/2000	P6/b(6)
031. letter	President Clinton to Jon Huenemann [partial] (1 page)	4/28/2000	P6/b(6)
032. letter	President Clinton to Jon Huenemann [partial] (1 page)	4/28/2000	P6/b(6)
033. draft letter	President Clinton to Jon Huenemann [partial] (1 page)	4/27/2000	P6/b(6)
034. draft letter	President Clinton to Jon Huenemann [partial] (1 page)	4/27/2000	P6/b(6)
035. draft letter	President Clinton to Jon Huenemann [partial] (1 page)	4/18/2000	P6/b(6)
036. letter	President Clinton to Cari Vickey [partial] (1 page)	4/28/2000	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

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Records Management (OP)
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OA/Box Number: 14801

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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037. form	Staff Request for Presidential Acknowledgement Letter, re: Vickey [partial] (1 page)	4/13/2000	P6/b(6)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Records Management (OP)
AF
OA/Box Number: 14801

FOLDER TITLE:

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2006-1000-F
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COPY



Maureen T. Shea

03/31/2000 08:37:29 AM




Record Type: Record

To: Woyneab M. Wondwossen/WHO/EOP@EOP

cc:

bcc:

Subject: Re: letter to Bassam Estwani 

He should be addressed as Imam Estwani - you know the language you use for such things, but we really would advise against the President going to that mosque so don't want to get his hopes up - if the President is going to do a mosque visit we would prefer it in one of the longer-established Muslim American communities - and we really aren't going to try to get him in for a one-on-one with the President. That is why we suggested he be referred to Mary Beth. But again, you know best how you usually handle this kind of situation. I just always fear how quickly people believe they'll get what they asked! many thanks.
Woyneab M. Wondwossen

Woyneab M. Wondwossen

03/30/2000 03:50:31 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Maureen T. Shea/WHO/EOP@EOP

cc:

Subject: letter to Bassam Estwani

Hi Maureen,

Please let me know if this draft response is ok. Also, what would be an appropriate salutation for Mr. Estwani?

Thanks.

Thank you for your letter. I appreciate your taking the time to outline your suggestions.

I am intrigued by your recommendation for an event at the White House celebrating the Christian, Muslim, and Jewish faiths, and I have forwarded your suggestion to my staff in the White House Social Office. I have also asked my schedulers to consider your invitation to visit the Dar Al Hijrah Islamic Center as well as your request for a meeting to discuss the idea of a book highlighting my Administration's efforts on behalf of Muslim Americans. I am pleased that there is increasing recognition in our nation of the Islamic faith and of the enormous contributions of the Muslim American community. As you know, my Administration has worked hard to foster awareness and inclusion, and I appreciate your interest in documenting our initiatives.

Again, thank you for bringing your wonderful ideas to my attention. Hillary and I hope you are well, and we send our best wishes.

COPY

COPY



Maureen T. Shea

03/13/2000 03:42:56 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Mary E. Cahill/WHO/EOP@EOP

cc: Robert B. Johnson/WHO/EOP@EOP, Christine A. Stanek/WHO/EOP@EOP, Daniel W. Burkhardt/WHO/EOP@EOP, Daniel E. O'Brien/WHO/EOP@EOP

Subject: President's request

I've received a copy of a letter from Bassam Estwani to the President on which President wrote: "I'm interested in all these suggestions." I suspect Estwani met the President at the Eid event, made verbal suggestions and was told to write a letter, and did, presenting it to him at the March 9 One America event.

Estwani makes three suggestions - as they fit somewhat with the discussions we are having as follow-up to the Arab American meeting, I suggest we review then. After that I can get a draft letter to Dan.

One: December event: because Eid al-Fitr (end of Ramadan) falls c. December 27, Hanukkah (December 22) and Christmas within one week of each other, we *could* hold an event at the WH celebrating all three (POTUS: "probably a good idea").

Two: visit to Islamic Center in Falls Church. He specifically mentioned March 16-20 or April 6. We have, as you know, considered visiting a mosque. These dates don't appear to work and it would seem that we might want a different locale, but it certainly should be a possibility.

Third: meeting with President (POTUS: "ok to do.") Since the Arab American meeting, I've had increased calls for a Muslim meeting. His request, however, is for him alone as a thank you because he wants to prepare a book on all the President has done for Muslims - might be quite good to do it and publicize.

Finally, President asks that we "collect all acts for Muslims." I assume he wants that to be sure that information is included in number three above - I've already done a list but will be sure it is updated.

Does this work for you?

3/15 — Due 3/31
Wayna
is scheduling going
to respond before
March suggested
dates? Is that a
problem?

Please note —

Both Al-Hijrah

Al-Hijrah

used
went up what write
used




Maureen T. Shea

04/05/2000 08:06:28 AM



Record Type: Record


To: Woyneab M. Wondwossen/WHO/EOP@EOP
cc: Joseph D. Ratner/WHO/EOP@EOP
bcc:
Subject: Re: letter to Bassam Estwani 

Good - it's Mary Beth Cahill - and I would ask him to be in touch with her... thanks
Woyneab M. Wondwossen

Woyneab M. Wondwossen

04/04/2000 03:24:26 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Maureen T. Shea/WHO/EOP@EOP
cc:
bcc:
Subject: Re: letter to Bassam Estwani 

Thanks for the info. Will this work?

Dear Imam Estawani:

It was good to see you at the One America event last month. I appreciate your taking the time to outline your suggestions, and I've asked Mary Cahill, Director of the White House Office of Public Liaison, to contact you regarding your recommendations.

I am pleased that there is increasing recognition in our country of the Islamic faith and of the increasingly significant role Muslims are playing in the life of our nation. As you know, my Administration has worked hard to foster religious freedom and to promote awareness and inclusion of all faiths. I appreciate your interest in documenting our initiatives and celebrating the

COPY

diverse traditions that enrich our nation's heritage.

Again, thank you for bringing your ideas to my attention.
Hillary and I hope you are well and extend our best wishes.

Maureen T. Shea



Maureen T. Shea

03/31/2000 08:37:29 AM

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bcc:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Stacy Reynolds to Dorian Weaver at 18:55. Subject: Special Oversight Board. (1 page)	01/14/1998	P2, P5
002. email	Marsha Scott to Charles Cole and Laura Demeo at 16:11. Subject: Haim Sabon. (1 page)	03/11/1999	P2, P5, P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Automated Records Management System [Email]
WHO ([Warren Rudman])
OA/Box Number: 500000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/29/1995-03/18/1999]

Van Zbinden
2006-1000-F
vz1166

RESTRICTION CODES

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RECORD TYPE: PRESIDENTIAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Stacy E. Reynolds (CN=Stacy E. Reynolds/OU=WHO/O=EOP [WHO])

CREATION DATE/TIME: 14-JAN-1998 18:55:35.00

SUBJECT: Special Oversight Board for DoD Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Bi

TO: Dorian V. Weaver (CN=Dorian V. Weaver/OU=WHO/O=EOP @ EOP [WHO])

READ: UNKNOWN

CC: Virginia R. Canter (CN=Virginia R. Canter/OU=WHO/O=EOP @ EOP [WHO])

READ: UNKNOWN

CC: Phu D. Huynh (CN=Phu D. Huynh/OU=WHO/O=EOP @ EOP [WHO])

READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

It is my understanding that the President announced his intent to appoint Warren Rudman as Chair of the Special Oversight Board for DoD Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents during a radio address last fall. (I don't know if this information is accurate -- it was one of those sudden crises that arose and disappeared.) I approved this announcement based on the fact that I was prepared to pre-approve him for pfiab at that time and, therefore, enough vetting had been done to pre-approve him for both jobs. However, I do not believe we ever received a start memo for Rudman for this position. Will we ever receive a start memo? The other question which has arisen now is whether financial review needs to be done on Rudman for this position. It appears that some additional financial review should be done since there may be concerns not addressed in the financial review for pfiab. However, we need to know whether he is up for the position (and preferably receive a start memo).

Are there other people being considered for this board? The draft executive order calls for up to 5 members. Ginny and I need to evaluate what vetting needs to be done if there are others. On my side the question is moot as it relates to Rudman since he just underwent a vet that was more extensive than what I would even consider for this position.

Please let me know what's going on.

Thanks,

Stacy

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001. email	Marsha Scott to Bob Nash, Laura Demeo, and Charles Cole at 14:06. Subject Haim Sabon. (1 page)	03/23/1999	P2, P5, P6/b(6)
002. email	Laura Demeo to Marsha Scott, Charles Ducan, and Charles Cole at 15:08. Subject: Re: Haim Sabon. (1 page)	03/25/1999	P2, P5, P6/b(6)
003. email	Marsha Scott to Charles Cole and Charles Ducan at 14:33. Subject: Re: Haim Sabon. (2 pages)	03/26/1999	P2, P5, P6/b(6)
004. email	Thurgood Marshall, Jr. to Kris Balderston at 18:15. Subject: Re: FYI-- PFIAB Report. (1 page)	06/14/1999	P5
005. email	Thurgood Marshall, Jr. to Setti Warren at 18:17. Subject: Re: FYI-- PFIAB Report. (2 pages)	06/14/1999	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
Automated Records Management System [Email]
WHO ([Warren Rudman])
OA/Box Number: 500000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/19/1999-06/21/1999]

Van Zbinden
2006-1000-F
vz1167

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RECORD TYPE: PRESIDENTIAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Thurgood Marshall Jr (CN=Thurgood Marshall Jr/OU=WHO/O=EOP [WHO])

CREATION DATE/TIME:14-JUN-1999 18:15:58.00

SUBJECT: Re: FYI - PFIAB Report, etc

TO: Kris M Balderston (CN=Kris M Balderston/OU=WHO/O=EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

CC: Setti D. Warren (CN=Setti D. Warren/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])

READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:

POTUS Foreign Intelligence Board (former Senator Rudman) -- Has a variety of duties, but has also been assigned to review the DOE Labs issue (recall that LeeAnn Inadomi got hot about it until she learned that Falle & Richardson thought it was OK). Apparently, PFIAB has completed its review and is issuing something tomorrow (this morning it sounded like this would occur this afternoon). DOJ believes that it will be taking hits on it and wants as much as it can get -- Harkins and Jennings).

Setti learned that the rpt/release will go out tomorrow and that no advance copy is appropriate. He is trying to arrange to get a copy of whatever is released for transmittal to DOJ at the appropriate time.

You should just file this in your memory bank in case it comes up tomorrow in the morning mtgs.

Kris M Balderston

06/14/99 06:11:51 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Thurgood Marshall Jr/WHO/EOP@EOP

cc:

Subject: Re: FYI - PFIAB Report, etc

what is it

COPY

RECORD TYPE: PRESIDENTIAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Thurgood Marshall Jr (CN=Thurgood Marshall Jr/OU=WHO/O=EOP [WHO])

CREATION DATE/TIME: 14-JUN-1999 18:17:47.00

SUBJECT: Re: FYI - PFIAB Report, etc

TO: Setti D. Warren (CN=Setti D. Warren/OU=WHO/O=EOP@EOP [WHO])
READ: UNKNOWN

TEXT:

Let me and/or Kris know if they get weird about giving information to DOJ. I can't imagine there would be a problem once it is released.

We should, however, be mighty pissed if someone around here leaks it first and DOJ doesn't get a chance to provide an informed response.

----- Forwarded by Thurgood Marshall Jr/WHO/EOP on
06/14/99 06:16 PM -----

Thurgood Marshall Jr

06/14/99 06:15:52 PM

Record Type: Record

To: Kris M Balderston/WHO/EOP
cc: Setti D. Warren/WHO/EOP@EOP
bcc: Records Management@EOP
Subject: Re: FYI - PFIAB Report, etc

POTUS Foreign Intelligence Board (former Senator Rudman) -- Has a variety of duties, but has also been assigned to review the DOE Labs issue (recall that LeeAnn Inadomi got hot about it until she learned that Falle & Richardson thought it was OK). Apparently, PFIAB has completed its review and is issuing something tomorrow (this morning it sounded like this would occur this afternoon). DOJ believes that it will be taking hits on it and wants as much as it can get -- Harkins and Jennings).

Setti learned that the rpt/release will go out tomorrow and that no advance copy is appropriate. He is trying to arrange to get a copy of whatever is released for transmittal to DOJ at the appropriate time.

You should just file this in your memory bank in case it comes up tomorrow in the morning mtgs.

Kris M Balderston
06/14/99 06:11:51 PM
Record Type: Record

To: Thurgood Marshall Jr/WHO/EOP@EOP

COPY

cc:

Subject: Re: FYI - PFIAB Report, etc

what is it

COPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	James Baker to Regina Genton and George Tenton re Roles and Mission (1 page)	06/22/1995	P5
002. email	Regina Genton to James Baker and George Tenet re: Roles and Mission (2 pages)	06/22/1995	P5
003. email	Rand Beers to Peter Bass et al. re: Invitation (1 page)	09/20/1995	P1/b(1)
004. email	Katherine Veit to Rand Beers et al. re: Invitation (1 page)	09/20/1995	P1/b(1)
005. email	Wilma Hall to Rand Beers re: Invitation (1 page)	09/25/1995	P1/b(1)
006. email	Judith Miscik to Ardenia Hawkins re: Killian Award (4 pages)	10/03/1995	P1/b(1)
007. email	Judith Miscik to Ardenia Hawkins re: Let's try it this way (2 pages)	10/03/1995	P1/b(1)
008. email	Cathy Millison to Daniel Benjamin re: Killian (4 pages)	10/05/1995	P1/b(1)
009. email	James Baker to Jane Baker et al. re: Revised IOB Report Memo (10 pages)	04/18/1996	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Warren Rudman and PFIAB..])
 OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/02/1995-04/18/1996]

Bevin Maloney
 2006-1000-F
 bm155

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

COPY

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 22 June 95 12:57
FROM Baker, James E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Subject: Roles and Mission/Class. [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Genton, Regina A.
Tenet, George J.
CARBON_COPY Hammond, Cathy J.
Hammonds, Lisa W.
Kreczko, Alan J.

TEXT_BODY

As you know, the Roles and Missions Commission is looking for original classification authority. This can be done by either the President (typically done in the form of an E.O. at the time the E.O. is first implemented) or by delegation from an official who already has original classification authority. There are a number of options here:

1. President signs short E.O. granting Chairman of the Roles and Missions Commission original class. authority.
2. Tony Lake delegates to Chairman.
3. Warren Rudman as Vice Chairman of the PFIAB (and therefore acting Chairman) delegates to Commission where he also serves as Vice Chairman (and ...).

I favor option 3 because it saves the President time, limits the number of E.O.'s, limits the number of officials with original classification authority (which Steve Garfinkle advises the Hill routinely beats up the Executive about) and, admittedly, saves the NSC/and OMB staff from staffing issue. John Bellinger favors a Presidential E.O. because of the importance of the Commission and avoidance of any taint that Commission is answering to someone other than the President.

What are your views? Please advise. I will also inquire of Mac Reed.
Thanks.

COPY

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 22 June 95 14:50
FROM Genton, Regina A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Subject: RE: Roles and Mission/Class. [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Baker, James E.
Tenet, George J.
CARBON_COPY Hammond, Cathy J.
Hammonds, Lisa W.
Kreczko, Alan J.

TEXT_BODY

I vote for option 3. There's no such thing as a short, simple Executive Order and don't believe the issue John raised is a real concern.

From: Baker, James E.
To: Genton, Regina A.; Tenet, George J.
CC: /R, Record at A1; Hammond, Cathy J.; Hammond, Lisa W.; Kreczko, Alan J.
Subject: Roles and Mission/Class. [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, June 22, 1995 12:57 PM

As you know, the Roles and Missions Commission is looking for original classification authority. This can be done by either the President (typically done in the form of an E.O. at the time the E.O. is first implemented) or by delegation from an official who already has original classification authority. There are a number of options here:

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2. Tony Lake delegates to Chairman.
3. Warren Rudman as Vice Chairman of the PFIAB (and therefore acting Chairman) delegates to Commission where he also serves as Vice Chairman (and ...).

I favor option 3 because it saves the President time, limits the number of E.O.'s, limits the number of officials with original classification authority (which Steve Garfinkle advises the Hill routinely beats up the Executive about) and, admittedly, saves the NSC/and OMB staff from staffing issue. John Bellinger favors a Presidential E.O. because of the importance of the Commission and avoidance of any taint that Commission is answering to

COPY

someone other than the President.

What are your views? Please advise. I will also inquire of Mac Reed.
Thanks.

COPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	James Baker to Jane Baker et al. re: Revised IOB memo (11 pages)	04/19/1996	P5
002. email	Steven Naplan to Julia Moffett re: porposed invitees (2 pages)	10/09/1996	P5
003. email	Lori Murray to Tara Sonenshine re: List (2 pages)	03/19/1997	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Warren Rudman and PFIAB..])
 OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/16/1996-03/10/1997]

Bevin Maloney
 2006-1000-F
 bm228

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

COPY

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 09 October 96, 11:49
FROM Naplan, Steven J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: proposed invitees [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Moffett, Julia
CARBON_COPY Blinken, Antony J.
Naplan, Steven J.
TEXT_BODY

additional names to consider for the next "generalist" influentials bkfst:

Fr. Donovan Gtown
Rev. Brian Hehir Ctr for Intl Affairs

influentials to consider if NATO expansion is part of focus:

Leon Aron AEI
Stephen Sestanovich Carnegie
Pat Glynn AEI
Peter Swiers Atlantic Council
Jack Matlock Inst for Advanced Studies
Harold Brown CSIS
Arnold Horelick RAND
Hans Binnendijk NDU
Jan Nowak Poland expert
Stephen Larrabee
Charles Gati
Ron Asmus RAND
Timothy Garton Ash

From: Naplan, Steven J.
To: Moffett, Julia
CC: /R, Record at A1; Blinken, Antony J.; Naplan, Steven J.
Subject: proposed invitees [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Tuesday, October 08, 1996 07:04 PM

proposed invitees for the next Generalist Breakfast(s)

first tier:

Mort Abramowitz Carnegie
Zbig Brzezinski CSIS

COPY

Fouad Ajami SAIS (Thursday mornings is usually a sched conflict for him)
Gen. Jones retired
Bill Maynes Foreign Policy
Jeremy Rosner Carnegie
Paula Stern Stern Group
Bette Bao Lord Freedom House
Joseph Nye Harvard
Bo Cutter Warburg, Pincus
Sargent Shriver Special Olympics

second tier:

Mort Halperin CFR
Janne Nolan Brookings
Barry Blechman Stimson
Charles Kupchan CFR
Joe Cirincione Stimson
Stan Roth USIP
Helmut Sonnenfeldt Brookings
Gen. Goodpaster Atlantic Council
Michael Beschloss Historian
Hendrick Smith author/Indep. Commentator
Graham Allison Harvard
Bill Kristol in his commentator capacity
Adm. Owens SAIC
Bill Moyers author/commentator
Pierre Salinger JFK press secr, frmr chf foreign corresp for ABC,
PR exec
Mel Levine frmr Rep., Atty in LA, MEPP advocate
Tom Foley PFIAB, frmr Speaker
Randal Robinson TransAfrica
Warren Rudman PFIAB, author

COPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Phone No. (Partial) (1 page)	09/08/1997	P6/b(6)
002. email	Phone No. (Partial) (1 page)	09/08/1997	P6/b(6)
003. email	James Baker to Donald Kerrick and Marc Hurwitz re: PFIAB meeting (2 pages)	11/04/1997	P2, P6/b(6)
004. email	Rand Beers to James Baker re: PFIAB note (2 pages)	11/04/1997	P2, P6/b(6)
005. email	James Baker to Mary McCarthy et al re: PFIAB Memo (3 pages)	11/06/1997	P2, P5, P6/b(6)
006. email	Mary McCarthy to James Baker, et al. re: PFIAB Memo (4 pages)	11/09/1997	P1/b(1), P2, P6/b(6)
007. email	Rand Beers to James Baker re: Meeting with Rudman (3 pages)	11/07/1997	P2, P5, P6/b(6)
008. email	David Sherman to Rand Beers et al. (4 pages)	12/08/1997	P1/b(1)
009. email	James Baker to Glyn Davies et al re: PFIAB call (1 page)	01/12/1998	P2, P6/b(6)
010. email	Address (Partial) (1 page)	02/05/1998	b(2)
011. email	Mary McCarthy to James Baker et al. re: Commission to Study Intelligence (2 pages)	05/13/1998	P5
012. email	Glyn Davies to Glyn Davies et al. re: FW: Commission to study Intelligence (2 pages)	05/13/1998	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97- Jan 01) ([Warren Rudman and PFIAB..])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/08/1997-05/13/1998]

Bevin Maloney
2006-1000-F
bm156

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

COPY

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/13/98 8:15:25 AM
FROM McCarthy, Mary O.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Commission to Study India/Intelligence? [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Baker, James E.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Davies, Glyn T.
Rudman, Mara E.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

well, tony has spoken. However, DCIs have a long history of ordering these kinds of inquiries into intelligence failures.

I'm just glad I'm not the NIO for Warning any more. (Although in MY DAY we covered possible Indian nuclear activity the minute we say ANY activity at the site; and this time we had the politicians actually talking about it, for heavens sake.)

Why don't I just get word to George to give Rudman a call.

-----Original Message-----

From: Baker,
James E.
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 1998 8:37 PM
To: Kerrick, Donald
L.; Davies, Glyn T.
Cc: McCarthy, Mary O.; Rudman, Mara E.; @LEGAL
- Legal Advisor
Subject: Commission to Study India/Intelligence?
[UNCLASSIFIED]

FYI:

Tony Harrington telephoned tonight to express concern about a press report that a commission was being appointed by someone (DCI?) to study the failure of the intelligence community to forecast the India test and report to the President and the Congress within ten days. He expressed the view on behalf of Warren Rudman as well, that the PFIAB should be consulted before establishing a commission whose role would seem to parallel the PFIAB's

COPY

own. (Whether the notion of also reporting to the Congress is a factor here I can not say, first I have heard of this.)

COPY

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/13/98 8:38:36 AM
FROM Davies, Glyn T.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Commission to Study India/Intelligence? [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Helweg, M. Diana
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Malley, Robert
Millison, Cathy L.
Rice, Edward A.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

-----Original Message-----

From: McCarthy, Mary O.
Sent: Wednesday,
May 13, 1998 8:35 AM
To: McCarthy, Mary O.; Baker, James E.; Kerrick,
Donald L.; Davies, Glyn T.; Rudman, Mara E.
Subject: RE: Commission
to Study India/Intelligence? [UNCLASSIFIED]

George will call Rudman

-----Original
Message-----

From: McCarthy, Mary O.
Sent: Wednesday, May 13,
1998 8:15 AM
To: Baker, James E.; Kerrick, Donald L.; Davies, Glyn
T.; Rudman, Mara E.
Subject: RE: Commission to Study India/Intelligence?
[UNCLASSIFIED]

well, tony has spoken. However, DCIs have a
long history of ordering these kinds of inquiries into intelligence

COPY

failures.

I'm just glad I'm not the NIO for Warning any more.
(Although in MY DAY we covered possible Indian nuclear activity the minute we say ANY activity at the site; and this time we had the politicians actually talking about it, for heavens sake.)

Why
don't I just get word to George to give Rudman a call.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Baker, James E.

Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 1998

8:37 PM

To: Kerrick, Donald L.; Davies, Glyn T.

Cc: McCarthy, Mary

O.; Rudman, Mara E.; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor

Subject: Commission

to Study India/Intelligence? [UNCLASSIFIED]

FYI:

Tony Harrington
telephoned tonight to express concern about a press report that a commission was being appointed by someone (DCI?) to study the failure of the intelligence community to forecast the India test and report to the President and the Congress within ten days. He expressed the view on behalf of Warren Rudman as well, that the PFIAB should be consulted before establishing a commission whose role would seem to parallel the PFIAB's own. (Whether the notion of also reporting to the Congress is a factor here I can not say, first I have heard of this.)

COPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Cathy Millison to Mary McCarthy et al. re: PFIAB (5 pages)	12/15/1998	P1/b(1)
002. email	Jane Bartlett to Brenda Curts re: Meeting (3 pages)	03/03/1999	P1/b(1)
003. email	Tomasz Malinowski to Charles Allen et al. re: PFIAB statement (3 pages)	03/18/1999	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97- Jan 01) ([Warren Rudman and PFIAB..])
 OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/15/1998-03/20/1999]

Bevin Maloney
 2006-1000-F
 bm157

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

COPY

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/18/99 4:09:30 PM
FROM Malinowski, Tomasz P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT pfiab statement [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO

Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Krass, Caroline D.
Curts, Brenda E.
Gladura, Timothy L.
Howerton, Barbara E.
Knepper, Charlotte
McCarthy, Mary O.
Merchant, Brian T.
Sherman, David J.
Ward, Steven R.
Arvizu, Alexander A.
Heitkotter, Karen R.
Keith, James R.
Lieberthal, Kenneth G.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Caravelli, John M.
Edwards, Joan K.
Harris, Elisa D.
Samore, Gary S.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Bobbitt, Philip C.
Crowley, Philip J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Greenberg, Brenda L.
Hammer, Michael A.
Leavy, David C.
Williams, Mary C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Hachigian, Nina L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Moretz, Sheila K.
O'Brien, Penelope R.
Rice, Edward A.

COPY

Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Sutphen, Mona K.

CARBON_COPY

Gray, Wendy E.
Halperin, David E.
Malinowski, Tomasz P.
Widmer, Edward L. (Ted)

TEXT_BODY

Attached is draft statement on PFIAB

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Doc3.doc
Draft Presidential Statement on PFIAB

Today I have asked Warren Rudman, the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, to undertake a review of security at the Department of Energy's weapons labs. The Board is a bipartisan, independent advisory body responsible, among other things, for assessing the quality and adequacy of our counterintelligence efforts.

I have asked the Board to address the nature of the security threat at the labs, the way in which that threat has evolved over the last two decades and the steps we have taken to counter it, as well as to recommend any additional steps that may be needed. The Board's report should be provided to the Congress, and to the fullest extent possible consistent with our national security, an unclassified version should be made public.

I am determined to do all that is necessary to protect our sensitive national security information and to prevent its diversion to foreign countries. Last year, I signed Presidential Decision Directive 61 to strengthen security and counter-intelligence at the labs. Since 1995, we have increased the Department of Energy's counterintelligence budget fifteen fold, from \$2 to \$30

COPY

million.

China as well as many other nations have tried to obtain sensitive information from us. This is a longstanding problem - the diversion of nuclear weapons information to China we are currently concerned about took place in the 1980s.

We should have no illusions about China's actions. But we should also remember our stake in maintaining a relationship with China that allows us to influence its actions in ways that make us more secure. That is and will remain the fundamental goal of our policy toward that country.

COPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Address (Partial) (1 page)	08/04/1999	b(2)
002. email	Steven Andreasen to Johannes Binnendijk et al. re: Issues (3 pages)	10/11/1999	P5
003. email	Maureen Tucker to Gary Samore re: FW: CTBT Next Steps (8 pages)	10/18/1999	P5
004. email	Andrew Weiss to Steven Andreasen et al. re: FW:CTBT Next Steps (8 pages)	10/18/1999	P5
005. email	Caroline Krass to Steven Andreasen et al. re: FW: Revised CTBT Next Steps Memo (9 pages)	10/19/1999	P5
006. email	Mary McCarthy to James Baker re: PFIAB Urgent (1 page)	01/21/2000	P6/b(6)
007. email	Mary McCarthy to Barbara Howerton et al re: Rudman letter (6 pages)	01/23/2000	P1/b(1)
008. email	Mary DeRosa to Maureen Tucker et al. re: Meeting (6 pages)	02/19/2000	P1/b(1)
009. email	Mary DeRosa to Maureen Tucker et al. re: Meeting (6 pages)	02/20/2000	P1/b(1)
010. email	Mary McCarthy to Bathsheba Crocker et al re: Intelligence Oversight Board (2 pages)	02/28/2000	P6/b(6)
011. email	Mary McCarthy to Mona Sutphen re: Intelligence Oversight Board [partial] [Page 2 closed in whole] (1 page)	02/29/2000	P6/b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97- Jan 01) ([Warren Rudman and PFIAB..])
 OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/02/1999-02/29/2000]

Bevin Maloney
 2006-1000-F
 bml59

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

COPY

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/11/99 12:44:06 PM

FROM Andreassen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT RE: [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Matthews, Sonyia (ADMIN)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Fallin, James (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Huff, Lindsey E. (PRESS)
Leavy, David C. (PRESS)
Schaefer, Christopher S. (ADMIN/INTERN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Andreassen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Bouchard, Joseph F. (DEFENSE)
Brackman, Stella S. (DEFENSE)
Kelly, Sandra L. (DEFENSE)
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J. (DEFENSE)
Mulligan, George D. (DEFENSE)
Peterman, David (Brian) (DEFENSE)
Pimentel, Betsy J. (DEFENSE)
Witkowsky, Anne A. (DEFENSE)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

I think there are two sets of issues to address, here, one short term, the other, long-term. How they are addressed in part relates to whether the vote on Tuesday/Wednesday is to postpone, or vote down, the Treaty. However, with all due respect to Bob, I would be cautious about immediately tasking the JASONS or PFIAB to do anything, for the simple reason that we will need some time to assess ourselves (in consultation with our Senate Democratic and Republican allies) what we really need.

Short Term

COPY

* POTUS statement.

Obviously, we will need one. As to what it will say ...

* Reaffirm

testing moratorium/yearly certification process. Under any scenario, I would strongly advise for the President to reaffirm his commitment to abide by a moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing (with the possible inclusion of the phrase "until a CTBT enters into force"), and to encourage all other states to do the same. The President would make clear we would continue with our annual certification process, as well as support for stockpile stewardship.

* Commit to

work on safeguards. Again, under any scenario, the President would commit to work with interested members, both Republicans and Democrats, on a set of CTBT Safeguards that would address the concerns raised regarding Stockpile Stewardship and Verification [FYI -- This is where there may be a role for the JASONs or PFIAB, or, an ad hoc group -- see below]. If the vote on the Treaty is simply postponed, that would be all that is needed. If the Treaty is voted down, we need to consider saying something along the lines of "in anticipation of resubmitting the Treaty for advice and consent at a later date," or "next year," or something like that.

* Work to obtain

further signatures and ratifications. The President should also make clear he will continue to press for signatures and ratifications from other states, so that the Treaty can enter into force at the earliest possible date. [FYI -- One of the best ways to keep this Treaty alive is to convince the new Indian government that they should still go forward with signature, despite our own problems in achieving ratification.]

Long term

* Outside group or panel. Under

any scenario, it might be possible to work with a bipartisan group of Senators on a set of safeguards (there are some very good ideas we have worked with Senate Dems over the past week) without involving from the outset -- or at all -- an outside group like JASONs or PFIAB. I remember well our (Bell/Andreasen) conversation with Tony Lake in early 1993 about whether or not to establish a blue-ribbon commission on whether or not to resume nuclear testing in advance of concluding a CTBT, and his advice about the dangers of chartering an outside panel, as opposed to determining the answer for ourselves, at least initially. An alternative would be to work with a set of Republicans (i.e., McCain, Hagel, Lugar, G. Smith, Stevens) and Democrats on a set of safeguards, and then bring together an ad hoc group that might include Rudman, Sid Drell, and others to "validate" our solution.

COPY

* Test Site Transparency. Need to consider taking a very serious and senior run at the Russians on this issue, which we have made no progress on in the last two-plus years, recognizing it will not necessarily change the overall monitoring estimate of the agency.

-----Original Message-----

From: Binnendijk,
Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Sent: Monday, October 11, 1999 10:00 AM
To: @RUDMAN; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @PRESS - Public Affairs; Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Subject: [UNCLASSIFIED]

The attached came out of weekend discussions with Bob Bell. Comments please on this draft. Hans

Please Pass To Sandy, Jim, and Mara
(from Hans)

As we proceed with plans to get CTBT off the Senate calendar, we should also consider ways to keep the issue alive next year and at the same time seek ways to win Senate converts for the next attempt (whenever that might be). We will need to demonstrate to the world that we are not walking away from our leadership position on non-proliferation. One way to accomplish this is for the President to announce that he has asked two distinguished groups to review for him the issues raised by last week's Senate debate and to recommend ways to deal with those issues. For example, the President might ask Warren Rudman and the Intelligence Advisory Board to review monitoring and verification issues. He might also ask the JASONs or some other group to review the Stockpile Stewardship issues raised. We could stagger the reporting dates for these two reports (ie. one in May, one in July) so that we could keep a sense of forward movement on the issue. Using groups such as these would provide expert judgements and still give us some degree of control over the product.

If you think this is a good idea, we would have to decide when to announce it. It might take a day or more to get the groups to agree in advance to take on this mission.
Bob Bell thinks
an effort like this would be very useful.

COPY

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/18/99 10:17:12 AM
FROM Tucker, Maureen E. (NONPRO)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: CTBT Next Steps [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO)

CARBON_COPY Tucker, Maureen E. (NONPRO)

TEXT_BODY Gary - this looks good; note he mentions the HPC issue w/Russia is heating up. Memo doesn't have a "Nonpro clearer". MT

-----Original

Message-----

From: Andreassen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)

Sent: Monday,

October 18, 1999 1:55 AM

To: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @LEGAL -

Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @NONPRO - Export

Controls; @PRESS - Public Affairs; @RUDMAN; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine;

@ASIA - Asian Affairs; Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA); Sutphen, Mona

K. (NSA)

Subject: CTBT Next Steps [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Colleagues

--

As per Sandy's request, attached is a first draft of a "where do we go from here" memo on CTBT. Please provide comments if at all possible by noon Monday, as I would like to send something forward to Sandy by the end of the day.

Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

CTBT Revival Plan.doc

COPY

October 18, 1999 (Draft 1)

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: HANS A. BINNENDIJK

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

SUBJECT: Next Steps on CTBT

This memorandum outlines steps we can take - both domestically and overseas - to lay the groundwork for revisiting the issue of CTBT in the Senate.

Background

Following last Wednesday's vote in the Senate, the President and senior administration officials have underscored three related themes:

- * The United States is not walking away from the CTBT, or (more broadly) our leadership in the area of arms control and nonproliferation.
- * The United States will maintain its moratorium on nuclear testing, and is encouraging all other states to do the same;
- * The United States remains committed to bringing the CTBT into force, and we will work to create the conditions for advice and consent in the Senate.

Our challenge now is to devise a process that both publicly and substantively demonstrates we are backing our words with actions.

Domestically

A word on "renegotiation." As we proceed, it is important to keep in mind one essential point. There is no practical option to renegotiate this Treaty (as Senator Lott and Senator Warner have suggested) or add reservations that would

COPY

require the consent of other parties to address the concerns raised by Treaty critics, for the simple reason that initiating a multilateral process to reopen U.S. concerns would inevitably invite other states (i.e., Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, India) to reopen their concerns (in many cases, the same issues, with preferred outcomes in the opposite direction).

Thus, our focus should be to develop the substantive and political basis for a set of safeguards or conditions that can be approved by the Senate in concert with the Treaty. These new safeguards or conditions would focus on addressing the two critical issues in the CTBT debate: stockpile stewardship and verification. Conversely, we should avoid encouraging - or participating - in a process that blue skies how the Treaty might be adjusted to be even more compatible with U.S. interests.

Beginning in the Senate. There are at least two steps we should take this week in the Senate to begin the process of moving forward.

* Senate Democrats. As a first step, we advise you consult with Senate Democrats (i.e., Daschle, Biden and Levin) to solicit their views on the way ahead. A discrete phone call, as opposed to a meeting, might be preferable at this stage. We will also sit down with Biden's staff in the next week or 10 days to review the additional conditions they had developed (but did not introduce) to the resolution of ratification beyond the Administration's six proposed CTBT Safeguards.

* Hagel and Lieberman. Senator's Hagel and Lieberman have announced they will work with their colleagues in the Senate and the Administration to see "what is salvageable" and to determine what changes need to be made to achieve enough support to pass a new nuclear test ban Treaty in the Senate. Despite their use of the terms "changes" and "new," we think Hagel and Lieberman

COPY

have in mind a process that could lead to safeguards and conditions, as opposed to renegotiation of the Treaty. Also advise that you call both Hagel and Lieberman to inquire as to their plans and to begin subtly steering them in the direction of safeguards and conditions. You might also offer to sit down with them at an early date.

* Other Republicans. At some future date, after developing an additional set of safeguards and conditions, we should discretely move to discuss these proposals with a core group of Republican Senators who might be persuaded to support them (or, adopt them as their own). This could include: Lugar, Warner, McCain, Stevens and Domenici.

Within the Administration. There are also a number of steps we need to take, and consider, within the Administration:

* Meeting with Albright, Cohen, Shelton, Richardson and Tenet. To coordinate next steps on the Treaty as well as communicate internally within the Administration that we are not giving up, suggest you schedule a meeting with core principals within two weeks to discuss a plan for moving forward (taking into account what we hear from Senate Democrats and Hagel-Lieberman).

* [120] day Administration study. As a first step, you could task an internal review in the Arms Control IWG of the concerns raised by Treaty opponents in last week's Senate debate, along with an analysis of how these concerns can be addressed through additional safeguards and conditions. Alternatively, you might ask someone from the outside - such as Charlie Curtis - to come in and conduct such a review.

* DOE study on Stewardship. Secretary Richardson has already chartered a 30 day review of the stockpile stewardship program in wake of the CTBT

COPY

vote in the Senate. This could be a useful input into the [120] day Administration study.

* Updated CIA Monitoring Estimate. The CIA is also on the hook to conclude an updated monitoring estimate (expected roughly by the end of this year). This will also need to be taken into account in the [120] day Administration study.

Outside validators. At some point, we will need to involve an outside group of validators in our efforts to legitimize an additional set of CTBT safeguards or conditions.

* "Informal" approach. The most informal - and controllable - approach would be to brief a set of outside experts on the results of our [120] day study, and see if they would agree to join in endorsing these additional safeguards or conditions. An initial set of candidates might include: Sam Nunn, Warren Rudman, George Shultz, Larry Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft, and Sid Drell. Ideally, this group might also include a prominent opponent or two, who could be convinced that our approach to safeguards and conditions provided a reasonable basis for moving forward.

* Established groups. There may, however, be pressure to immediately counter suggestions by Senators Lott and Warner to set up an outside commission to examine various issues surrounding CTBT (FYI - Lott wrote Secretary Cohen suggesting [insert - need copy of Lott letter to Cohen from NSC Leg]; and Warner suggested publicly that Jim Schlesinger be given the con in examining what changes to the Treaty are required). One possibility would be to make known our intention to ask an established group or set of groups such as the PFIAB or JASONs to review the results of our internal [120]-day Administration study.

* Bipartisan commission. Alternatively, if necessary to maintain the

COPY

initiative,
we could move quickly to establish an outside bipartisan commission
- drawing
from the suggested validators identified above - to review the issue of
safeguards or conditions. While early involvement of such a group
would
demonstrate publicly our commitment to proceeding with a process to
get CTBT
ratified, taking this step without knowing ourselves where we would
like to head
(in terms of safeguards or conditions) risks losing control of the final
product,
unless the commission's charter is carefully crafted and adhered to.

Internationally

Signatures and ratifications. Movement by any one of three key states
to sign
and/or ratify the CTBT in the wake of the U.S. Senate's refusal to
approve the
Treaty could help create momentum for revisiting the issue in our own
Senate.
Thus, we should do what we can - both directly, and through
surrogates - to try
to advance CTBT in these three key states:

* India. The new Indian government has stated it is committed to
achieving a
domestic consensus on the issue of CTBT. Achieving Indian signature
in the run
up to the President's trip to South Asia would be a major
accomplishment,
underscoring the nonproliferation benefits of the Treaty and its
potential to
help reduce nuclear tensions in South Asia. This could also trigger
Pakistani
signature.

* China. China has said it will accelerate its own ratification in the
wake of
the Senate's refusal to approve the Treaty. This may be more than
rhetoric:
China could seize the "moral high ground" on the proliferation issue
vis-à-vis
the U.S. and position itself favorably with the international
community in
advance of the NPT Review Conference next April if it were to
proceed with
ratification.

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* Russia. President Yeltsin had given orders to accelerate the preparation of ratification documents to be presented to the Duma prior to the Senate's vote on CTBT. Like China, Russia might see an opportunity to seize the moral high ground vis-à-vis the U.S. by proceeding with its own ratification, although the dynamic with the Duma makes this even more problematic than is the case with China.

Group of 44. More generically, we should also push for ratification over the next six months in all of the states in the "Group of 44" whose ratification is required for entry into force of the Treaty - in particular, those states that have signed but not ratified the CTBT (i.e., [insert]).

Test Site Transparency. Given the focus of Senator Warner and others on activities at Novaya Zemlya, we need to raise the profile of the Test Site Transparency issue with the Russians, recognizing it: (a) will be very difficult (Russia is insisting on concessions in the area of supercomputers in exchange for transparency at former test sites) and (b) will not necessarily change the CIA's overall monitoring estimate (that is, that a "zero yield" prohibition on nuclear explosive testing is extremely difficult to monitor, with or without test site transparency). Moreover, given that China too is conducting experiments at its former test site, they would almost certainly have to be brought into this process (and China has been even more opaque than Russia regarding these activities).

Other arms control

Finally, we need to consider the lessons of the CTBT experience as it relates to the rest of our arms control agenda for the next 15 months, in particular, both ABM and START:

* Consultations. We should take advantage of the establishment of the

COPY

National
Security Working Group in the Senate and use this group to consult
regularly on
both ABM and START as our discussions with Russia unfold. We
should also make a
special effort to consult with the Leadership and key members.

* Demarcation and Succession agreements. If the Russian Duma were
to approve
START II, we would not now advise transmitting the ABM
Demarcation and Succession
agreements to the Senate until after: (a) the 2000 election, or (b)
conclusion
of an agreement on ABM amendments for NMD. In any other context,
we would expect
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blindfold and cigar
treatment as CTBT.

Concurrences by: Leavy Lackey Halperin Krass
Riedel Lieberthal Pascual

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COPY

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/18/99 3:10:41 PM
FROM Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: CTBT Next Steps [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreassen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)

CARBON_COPY Barnett, Cheryl E. (RUE)
Dunn, John A. (RUE/INTERN)
Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)
Kaufman, Stuart J. (RUE)
Loring, Pamela (RUE)
Pascual, Carlos E. (RUE)
Segal, Jack D. (NONPRO)
Silva, Mary Ann T. (RUE)
Tedstrom, John E. (RUE)
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Andreassen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Bouchard, Joseph F. (DEFENSE)
Brackman, Stella S. (DEFENSE)
Kelly, Sandra L. (DEFENSE)
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J. (DEFENSE)
Mulligan, George D. (DEFENSE)
Peterman, David (Brian) (DEFENSE)
Pimentel, Betsy J. (DEFENSE)
Witkowsky, Anne A. (DEFENSE)

TEXT_BODY looks good. some suggestions.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen,
Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Sent: Monday, October 18, 1999 1:55 AM
To: @DEFENSE
- Defense Policy; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT -
Legislative
Affairs; @NONPRO - Export Controls; @PRESS - Public Affairs;
@RUDMAN;
@RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @ASIA - Asian Affairs; Crocker,
Bathsheba
N. (NSA); Sutphen, Mona K. (NSA)
Subject: CTBT Next Steps [UNCLASSIFIED]

COPY

Importance: High

Colleagues

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As per Sandy's request, attached is a first draft of a "where do we go from here" memo on CTBT. Please provide comments if at all possible by noon Monday, as I would like to send something forward to Sandy by the end of the day.

Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CTBT Revival Plan.doc

October 18, 1999 (Draft 1)

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: HANS A. BINNENDIJK

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

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COPY

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COPY

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* Bipartisan commission. Alternatively, if necessary to maintain the initiative, we could move quickly to establish an outside bipartisan commission - drawing from the suggested validators identified above - to review the issue of safeguards or conditions. While early involvement of such a group would demonstrate publicly our commitment to proceeding with a process to get CTBT ratified, taking this step without knowing ourselves where we would like to head (in terms of safeguards or conditions) risks losing control of the final product, unless the commission's charter is carefully crafted and adhered to.

Internationally

Signatures and ratifications. Movement by any one of three key states to sign and/or ratify the CTBT in the wake of the U.S. Senate's refusal to approve the Treaty could help create momentum for revisiting the issue in our own Senate. Thus, we should do what we can - both directly, and through surrogates - to try to advance CTBT in these three key states:

* India. The new Indian government has stated it is committed to achieving a domestic consensus on the issue of CTBT. Achieving Indian signature in the run up to the President's trip to South Asia would be a major accomplishment, underscoring the nonproliferation benefits of the Treaty and its potential to

COPY

help reduce nuclear tensions in South Asia. This could also trigger Pakistani signature.

* China. China has said it will accelerate its own ratification in the wake of the Senate's refusal to approve the Treaty. This may be more than rhetoric: China could seize the "moral high ground" on the proliferation issue vis-à-vis the U.S. and position itself favorably with the international community in advance of the NPT Review Conference next April if it were to proceed with ratification.

* Russia. President Yeltsin had given orders to accelerate the preparation of ratification documents to be presented to the Duma prior to the Senate's vote on CTBT. It is unlikely that the Russians will act quickly on the Treaty. We expect that the new Duma, which will be seated in January, will probably consider the Treaty, but it is difficult to predict timing of further action

Group of 44. More generically, we should also push for ratification over the next six months in all of the states in the "Group of 44" whose ratification is required for entry into force of the Treaty - in particular, those states that have signed but not ratified the CTBT (i.e., [insert]).

Test Site Transparency. Given the focus of Senator Warner and others on activities at Novaya Zemlya, we need to raise the profile of the Test Site Transparency issue with the Russians, recognizing it: (a) will be very difficult (Russia is insisting on concessions in the area of supercomputers in exchange for transparency at former test sites) and (b) will not necessarily change the CIA's overall monitoring estimate (that is, that a "zero yield" prohibition on nuclear explosive testing is extremely difficult to monitor, with or without test site transparency). Moreover, given that China too is conducting experiments at its

COPY

former test site, they would almost certainly have to be brought into this process (and China has been even more opaque than Russia regarding these activities).

Other arms control

Finally, we need to consider the lessons of the CTBT experience as it relates to the rest of our arms control agenda for the next 15 months, in particular, both ABM and START:

- * Consultations. We should take advantage of the establishment of the National Security Working Group in the Senate and use this group to consult regularly on both ABM and START as our discussions with Russia unfold. We should also make a special effort to consult with the Leadership and key members.

- * Demarcation and Succession agreements. In the unlikely event that the Russian Duma approves START II, we would not now advise transmitting the ABM Demarcation and Succession agreements to the Senate until after: (a) the 2000 election, or (b) conclusion of an agreement on ABM amendments for NMD and START III. In any other context, we would expect the Demarcation and Succession agreements to receive the same blindfold and cigar treatment as CTBT.

Concurrences by: Leavy Lackey Halperin Krass
Riedel Lieberthal Pascual

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/19/99 2:41:31 PM
FROM Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Revised CTBT Next Steps Memo [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)

CARBON_COPY
Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Bouchard, Joseph F. (DEFENSE)
Brackman, Stella S. (DEFENSE)
Kelly, Sandra L. (DEFENSE)
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J. (DEFENSE)
Mulligan, George D. (DEFENSE)
Peterman, David (Brian) (DEFENSE)
Pimentel, Betsy J. (DEFENSE)
Witkowsky, Anne A. (DEFENSE)
Allen, Charles A. (LEGAL)
Baker, James E. (LEGAL)
DeRosa, Mary B. (LEGAL)
Hunerwadel, Joan S. (LEGAL)
Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)

TEXT_BODY
Attached are our changes.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen,
Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 1999 9:13 AM
To: @PRESS
- Public Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor
Subject: FW: Revised CTBT
Next Steps Memo [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Dave/Matt/Jamie/Caroline

-- if there was any doubt from the below ... I am waiting for you
to either provide inputs and / or clearance before going forward
... Steve.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven
P. (DEFENSE)

COPY

Sent: Monday, October 18, 1999 11:19 PM

To: @DEFENSE

- Defense Policy; @NONPRO - Export Controls; @LEGISLAT -
Legislative

Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @PRESS - Public Affairs;

@RUDMAN;

@SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters; Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA);
Sutphen,

Mona K. (NSA)

Subject: Revised CTBT Next Steps Memo [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Includes

comments from all offices except press and legal.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CTBT Revival Plan.doc

October 18, 1999 (Draft 2)

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: HANS A. BINNENDIJK

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

SUBJECT: Next Steps on CTBT

This memorandum outlines steps we can take - both domestically and
overseas - to

lay the groundwork for revisiting the issue of CTBT in the Senate.

Background

Overview. The Senate Test Ban vote is clearly perceived domestically
and

overseas as a setback for the Administration and for global efforts to
slow the

spread of nuclear weapons. But the Senate's rejection of the Treaty -
and the

high public profile it has generated on this issue - might yet be used to
our

advantage, in terms of laying the groundwork for subsequent and
favorable

consideration of the Treaty.

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Basic themes. Following last Wednesday's vote in the Senate, the President and senior administration officials have underscored three related themes:

- * The United States is not walking away from our leadership in the area of arms control and nonproliferation.
- * The United States will maintain its moratorium on nuclear testing, and is encouraging all other states to do the same;
- * The United States remains committed to bringing the CTBT into force, and we will work to create the conditions for advice and consent in the Senate.

Our challenge now is to devise a process that both publicly and substantively demonstrates we are backing our words with actions.

Domestically

A word on "renegotiation." As we proceed, it is important to keep in mind one essential point. There is no practical option to renegotiate this Treaty (as Senator Lott and Senator Warner have suggested) or add reservations that would require the consent of other parties to address the concerns raised by Treaty critics, for the simple reason that initiating a multilateral process to reopen U.S. concerns would inevitably invite other states (i.e., Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, India) to reopen their concerns (in many cases, the same issues, with preferred outcomes in the opposite direction).

Thus, our focus should be to develop the substantive and political basis for a set of safeguards or conditions that can be approved by the Senate in concert with the Treaty. These new safeguards or conditions (short of renegotiation) would focus on addressing the two critical issues in the CTBT debate: stockpile stewardship and verification. Conversely, we should avoid encouraging - or

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participating - in a process that blue skies how the Treaty might be adjusted to be even more compatible with U.S. interests.

Beginning in the Senate. There are at least two steps we should take this week in the Senate to begin the process of moving forward.

* Senate Democrats. As a first step, we advise you consult with Senate Democrats (i.e., Daschle, Biden and Levin) to solicit their views on the way ahead. A discrete phone call, as opposed to a meeting, might be preferable at this stage. We will also sit down with Biden's staff in the next week or 10 days to review the additional conditions they had developed (but did not introduce) to the resolution of ratification beyond the Administration's six proposed CTBT Safeguards.

* Hagel and Lieberman. Senator's Hagel and Lieberman have announced they will work with their colleagues in the Senate and the Administration to see "what is salvageable" and to determine what changes need to be made to achieve enough support to pass a new nuclear test ban Treaty in the Senate. Despite their use of the terms "changes" and "new," we think Hagel and Lieberman have in mind a process that could lead to safeguards and conditions, as opposed to renegotiation of the Treaty. Also advise that you call both Hagel and Lieberman to inquire as to their plans and to begin subtly steering them in the direction of safeguards and conditions. You might also offer to sit down with them at an early date.

* Other Treaty opponents. At some future date, after developing an additional set of safeguards and conditions, we should discretely move to discuss these proposals with a core group of Senators who recently opposed the Treaty but might be persuaded to support them (or, adopt them as their own). This could

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include: Lugar, Warner, McCain, Stevens and Domenici.

Within the Administration. There are also a number of steps we need to take, and consider, within the Administration:

- * Meeting with Albright, Cohen, Shelton, Richardson and Tenet. To coordinate next steps on the Treaty as well as communicate internally within the Administration that we are not giving up, suggest you schedule a meeting with core principals within two weeks to discuss a plan for moving forward (taking into account what we hear from Senate Democrats and Hagel-Lieberman).

- * [120] day Administration study. As a first step, you could task an internal review in the Arms Control IWG of the concerns raised by Treaty opponents in last week's Senate debate, along with an analysis of how these concerns can be addressed through additional safeguards and conditions. Alternatively, you might ask someone from the outside - such as Charlie Curtis - to come in and conduct such a review.

- * DOE Study on Stewardship. Secretary Richardson has already chartered a 30 day review of the stockpile stewardship program in wake of the CTBT vote in the Senate. This could be a useful input into the [120] day Administration study.

- * Updated CIA Monitoring Estimate. The CIA is also on the hook to conclude an updated monitoring estimate (expected roughly by the end of this year). This will also need to be taken into account in the [120] day Administration study.

Outside validators. At some point, we will need to involve an outside group of validators in our efforts to legitimize an additional set of CTBT safeguards or conditions.

- * "Informal" approach. The most informal - and controllable - approach would be

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to brief a set of outside experts on the results of our [120] day study, and see if they would agree to join in endorsing these additional safeguards or conditions. An initial set of candidates might include: Sam Nunn, Warren Rudman, George Shultz, Larry Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft, and Sid Drell. Ideally, this group might also include a prominent opponent or two, who could be convinced that our approach to safeguards and conditions provided a reasonable basis for moving forward.

* Established groups. There may, however, be pressure to immediately counter suggestions by Senators Lott and Warner to set up an outside commission to examine various issues surrounding CTBT (FYI - Lott wrote Secretary Cohen suggesting that he undertake a "comprehensive review of the state of U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities," and Senator Warner has suggested publicly that a commission under the chairmanship of Jim Schlesinger be given the con in examining what changes to the Treaty are required). One possibility would be to make known our intention to ask an established group or set of groups such as the PFIAB or JASONs to review the results of our internal [120]-day Administration study.

* Bipartisan commission. Alternatively, if necessary to maintain the initiative, we could move quickly to establish an outside bipartisan commission - drawing from the suggested validators identified above (for example, this could be a two-person panel with Nunn and Eagleburger, or a somewhat broader group) - to review the issue of safeguards or conditions. While early involvement of such a group would demonstrate publicly our commitment to proceeding with a process to get CTBT ratified, taking this step without knowing ourselves where we would like to head (in terms of safeguards or conditions) risks losing control of the final product, unless the commission's charter is carefully crafted and

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adhered to.

Internationally

Signatures and ratifications. Movement by any one of three key states to sign and/or ratify the CTBT in the wake of the U.S. Senate's refusal to approve the Treaty could help create momentum for revisiting the issue in our own Senate.

Thus, we should do what we can - both directly, and through surrogates - to try to advance CTBT in these three key states:

* India. The new Indian government has stated it is committed to achieving a domestic consensus on the issue of CTBT. Achieving Indian signature in the run up to the President's trip to South Asia would be a major accomplishment, underscoring the nonproliferation benefits of the Treaty and its potential to help reduce nuclear tensions in South Asia. This could also trigger Pakistani signature (which might also be attainable, despite recent political developments in Pakistan).

* China. China has said it will accelerate its own ratification in the wake of the Senate's refusal to approve the Treaty. This may be more than rhetoric: China could seize the "moral high ground" on the proliferation issue vis-à-vis the U.S. and position itself favorably with the international community in advance of the NPT Review Conference next April if it were to proceed with ratification.

* Russia. President Yeltsin had given orders to accelerate the preparation of ratification documents to be presented to the Duma prior to the Senate's vote on CTBT. It is unlikely that the Russians will act quickly on the Treaty. We expect that the new Duma, which will be seated in January, will probably consider the Treaty, but it is difficult to predict timing of further action.

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Group of 44. More generically, we should also push for ratification over the next six months in all of the states in the "Group of 44" whose ratification is required for entry into force of the Treaty - in particular, those states that have signed but not ratified the CTBT (i.e., Algeria, Bangladesh, Chile, China, Columbia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Zaire). Setting aside India and Pakistan, this leaves only North Korea - who is unlikely to sign or ratify without a big incentive.

Test Site Transparency. Given the focus of Senator Warner and others on activities at Novaya Zemlya, we need to raise the profile of the Test Site Transparency issue with the Russians, recognizing it: (a) will be very difficult (Russia is insisting on concessions in the area of supercomputers in exchange for transparency at former test sites) and (b) will not necessarily change the CIA's overall monitoring estimate (that is, that a "zero yield" prohibition on nuclear explosive testing is extremely difficult to monitor, with or without test site transparency). Moreover, given that China too is conducting experiments at its former test site, they would almost certainly have to be brought into this process (and China has been even more opaque than Russia regarding these activities).

Other arms control

Finally, we need to consider the lessons of the CTBT experience as it relates to the rest of our arms control agenda for the next 15 months, in particular, both ABM and START:

* Consultations. We should take advantage of the establishment of the National Security Working Group in the Senate and use this group to consult regularly on both ABM and START as our discussions with Russia unfold. We

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should also make a special effort to consult with the Leadership and key members.

* Demarcation and Succession agreements. In the unlikely event that the Russian Duma approves START II, we would not now advise transmitting the ABM Demarcation and Succession agreements to the Senate until after: (a) the 2000 election, or (b) conclusion of an agreement on ABM amendments for NMD and START III. In any other context, we would expect the Demarcation and Succession agreements to receive the same treatment as CTBT.

Finally, concluding CFE next month at Istanbul would provide an immediate boost to the concept that multilateral arms control did not die with the Senate's vote against CTBT.

Concurrences by: Leavy Lackey Halperin Krass
Camp Lieberthal Weiss Samore
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Gary Samore to James Keith re: FW Congressional Letter (6 pages)	07/07/1999	P5
002. email	James Keith to Miles Lackey and Daniel Shapiro re: FW: Congressional Letter (6 pages)	07/07/1999	P5
003. email	James Keith to Miles Lackey et al. re: FW: Congressional Letter (6 pages)	07/07/1999	P5
004. email	James Keith to Mary McCarthy re: FW: Congressional Letter (6 pages)	07/08/1999	P5
005. email	Mara Rudman to Mona Sutphen et al. re: china paragraph (2 pages)	07/15/1999	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange Non-Record (Mar 97- Jan 01) ([Warren Rudman and PFIAB...])
 OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/24/1999-07/16/1999]

Bevin Maloney
 2006-1000-F
 bm525

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/7/99 9:47:46 AM
FROM Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Congressional Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Keith, James R. (ASIA)

CARBON_COPY Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO)
Gray, Wendy E. (SPCHW/CNSLR)
Rudman, Mara E. (CNSLR)
Arvizu, Alexander A. (ASIA)
Hill, John J. (ASIA/INTERN)
Keith, James R. (ASIA)
Lieberthal, Kenneth G. (ASIA)
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L. (ASIA)

TEXT_BODY Good letter. Couple of comments.

-----Original Message-----

From: Keith,
James R. (ASIA)
Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 1999 8:46 AM
To: Samore,
Gary S. (NONPRO)
Cc: @NONPRO - Export Controls; @RUDMAN; @LEGISLAT
- Legislative Affairs
Subject: Congressional Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

SRB

asked that you and Mara take a close look at the re-write of a letter that has been bouncing around for months. Text below includes Mara's final edits. I'm ready to send this back to the front office as soon as you review for a last time. I'll send down to you a copy of SRB's note and the incoming. Incoming is from Rep. Sweeny and 48 additional members. Jim

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2403RedoPOTUSltr 1.doc

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Dear Representative Ballenger:

Thank you for your letter regarding U.S. policy toward China and suggestions as to how we should proceed in our bilateral relationship.

Our policy toward China is realistic and based on what is in our nation's best interest. Our policy of purposeful engagement has led to real progress on matters of vital interest to the United States, such as non-proliferation, stability on the Korean peninsula and management of the Asian financial crisis.

With respect to the specific points you raised in your letter, Premier Zhu and I spent a great deal of time discussing the subject of regional economic security. Regarding the territorial claims in the South China Sea, I assure you that all contestants, including the Chinese, are well aware of our continuing interest in peaceful resolution of differences over the Spratly Islands through dialogue.

You also expressed support for democracy in Taiwan and mentioned a report prepared by the Defense Department that documents the increase in Chinese production and deployment of missiles capable of striking Taiwan. We too are concerned by this trend. We have provided the defensive arms and services Taiwan needs, including Patriot-type air defense systems, and, I assure you, we will continue to help it meet its needs consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act. In the long-term, I remain convinced

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that reduction of tension in the Taiwan Strait depends on the continuing evolution of common interests between the people on Taiwan and the people in the People's Republic of China. Only through the steady development of confidence and trust between Taipei and Beijing can we expect a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue on terms acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I made these points in unequivocal terms to Premier Zhu.

You also raised China's military modernization and allegations of Chinese clandestine efforts to obtain sensitive U.S. technology. I agree that this is a serious matter. We are under no illusions about efforts by China to obtain sensitive information from us and we work hard to ensure that our national security is protected against such efforts. For instance, the United States does not export weapons to China, nor does the U.S. Government approve exports of controlled dual-use items to the People's Liberation Army or the police. One of the agreements we reached with China during my visit last summer was to allow previously unobtainable post-shipment verification checks of exports to civilian end-users to assure they are used as intended. We will continue to enhance the effectiveness of our post-shipment verification system.

With regard to Chinese espionage at U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories, I take this threat seriously and am determined to take all steps necessary to protect sensitive national security information. Once National Security Advisor Berger was informed on the potential magnitude of Chinese efforts in July 1997, we acted quickly to evaluate the information and develop new procedures to strengthen security at the nuclear weapons labs, promulgating a sweeping Presidential Decision Directive in February 1998, long before this issue got public attention. I also asked the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, chaired by

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Warren Rudman, to do a comprehensive assessment of the counterintelligence threat at the national labs and the adequacy of measures put in place to counter this threat, and to deliver their report to Congress. In its excellent report, the PFIAB, concluded that the Administration has undertaken far-reaching reforms in addressing systemic problems at the national labs, though it also recommended additional reforms, which we are evaluating. The final point I would make is that during his April visit, I told Premier Zhu that espionage or other efforts to circumvent our technology transfer laws were unacceptable.

We have worked hard, and successfully, to improve Chinese conduct on non-proliferation. The Administration has gained China's agreement to:

- * sign and submit for ratification the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- * cease all cooperation with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities;
- * engage in no new nuclear cooperation with Iran, including for peaceful purposes;
- * provide no more C-801/802 anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran;
- * promulgate national nuclear export laws and regulations controlling export of dual-use items with nuclear applications;
- * sign the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- * commit to improve verification and implementation provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention.

More remains to be done. We will continue to urge the Chinese to tighten further their controls on export of missile technology and are urging them take the steps necessary for eligibility in the Missile Technology Control Regime.

On human rights, we continue to have significant differences with China, which I raised with Premier Zhu during his April visit. My Administration has been very clear, publicly and privately, in condemning the arrests and convictions of pro-democracy activists. We will continue to call attention to such human rights abuses, something we have done most recently through our resolution

COPY

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the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva.
We will also
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on a broad
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There will continue to be challenges in our bilateral relationship with
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accidental bombing to the Chinese leadership in Beijing should put us
on the path
toward a more positive agenda in our relationship. In this and other
areas, we
will continue our efforts to get the Chinese to address advancing our
relationship in ways that promote U.S. interests.

In particular, we are seeking to open China's market to American
exports, build a
more reciprocal trade relationship, promote the rule of law in China,
and
accelerate China's integration into the world economy by concluding a
strong deal
with China on its accession to the World Trade Organization. We will
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consulting closely with the Congress as these efforts progress. Our
goal remains
to conclude a commercially sound deal with China this year.

Thank you again for writing. I appreciate your concerns and intend to
continue
working with the Congress to promote U.S. national interests in our
relationship
with China.

Sincerely,

COPY

The Honorable Cass Ballenger
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3310

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COPY

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/7/99 9:53:05 AM
FROM Keith, James R. (ASIA)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Congressional Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)

CARBON_COPY Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)

TEXT_BODY

Pls take a last look at this letter cleared by Mara and Gary. This is the one that has been kicking around since April. SRB wanted Mara and Gary to review the REDO, noted that he thought this was an important letter. (Let me know if you need the incoming.) With your concurrence, I'll forward back to f.o. Thanks, Jim

-----Original

Message-----

From: Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO)
Sent: Wednesday,
July 07, 1999 9:48 AM
To: Keith, James R. (ASIA)
Cc: Samore, Gary
S. (NONPRO); @RUDMAN; @ASIA - Asian Affairs
Subject: FW: Congressional
Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Good letter. Couple of
comments.

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From: Keith, James R. (ASIA)

Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 1999 8:46 AM
To: Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO)
Cc: @NONPRO
- Export Controls; @RUDMAN; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Subject: Congressional

COPY

Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

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Jim

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2403RedoPOTUSltr 1.doc

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Thank you for your letter regarding U.S. policy toward China and suggestions as to how we should proceed in our bilateral relationship.

Our policy toward China is realistic and based on what is in our nation's best interest. Our policy of purposeful engagement has led to real progress on matters of vital interest to the United States, such as non-proliferation, stability on the Korean peninsula and management of the Asian financial crisis.

With respect to the specific points you raised in your letter, Premier Zhu and I spent a great deal of time discussing the subject of regional economic security. Regarding the territorial claims in the South China Sea, I assure you that all contestants, including the Chinese, are well aware of our continuing interest in

COPY

peaceful resolution of differences over the Spratly Islands through dialogue.

You also expressed support for democracy in Taiwan and mentioned a report prepared by the Defense Department that documents the increase in Chinese production and deployment of missiles capable of striking Taiwan. We too are concerned by this trend. We have provided the defensive arms and services Taiwan needs, including Patriot-type air defense systems, and, I assure you, we will continue to help it meet its needs consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act. In the long-term, I remain convinced that reduction of tension in the Taiwan Strait depends on the continuing evolution of common interests between the people on Taiwan and the people in the People's Republic of China. Only through the steady development of confidence and trust between Taipei and Beijing can we expect a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue on terms acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I made these points in unequivocal terms to Premier Zhu.

You also raised China's military modernization and allegations of Chinese clandestine efforts to obtain sensitive U.S. technology. I agree that this is a serious matter. We are under no illusions about efforts by China to obtain sensitive information from us and we work hard to ensure that our national security is protected against such efforts. For instance, the United States does not export weapons to China, nor does the U.S. Government approve exports of controlled dual-use items to the People's Liberation Army or the police. One of the agreements we reached with China during my visit last summer was to allow previously unobtainable post-shipment verification checks of exports to civilian end-users to assure they are used as intended. We will continue to enhance the effectiveness of our post-shipment verification system.

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House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3310

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4

COPY

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DATE-TIME 7/7/99 10:54:40 AM
FROM Keith, James R. (ASIA)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Congressional Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Note adjustment to gary's language by mara. jk

-----Original

Message-----

From: Rudman, Mara E. (CNSLR)

Sent: Wednesday, July

07, 1999 10:39 AM

To: Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO)

Cc: Keith, James

R. (ASIA); @RUDMAN

Subject: FW: Congressional Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Gary
(and Jim):

I'd stay away from making 96/97 distinctions that also force us to characterize one or the other brief -- particularly in a letter like this that will have widespread distribution. For same reason, i would include the date of PDD 61 without flagging the "long

before it received public attention" because I think some of the letter recipients will (rightly) take it as a tweak at them which, however deserved, we should try to avoid.

-----Original Message-----

From: Samore,

Gary S. (NONPRO)

Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 1999 9:48 AM

COPY

To: Keith,
James R. (ASIA)
Cc: Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO); @RUDMAN; @ASIA -
Asian Affairs
Subject: FW: Congressional Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

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Our policy toward China is realistic and based on what is in our nation's best interest. Our policy of purposeful engagement has led to real progress on matters of vital interest to the United States, such as non-proliferation, stability on the Korean peninsula and management of the Asian financial crisis.

With respect to the specific points you raised in your letter, Premier Zhu and I spent a great deal of time discussing the subject of regional economic security. Regarding the territorial claims in the South China Sea, I assure you that all contestants, including the Chinese, are well aware of our continuing interest in peaceful resolution of differences over the Spratly Islands through dialogue.

You also expressed support for democracy in Taiwan and mentioned a report prepared by the Defense Department that documents the increase in Chinese production and deployment of missiles capable of striking Taiwan. We too are concerned by this trend. We have provided the defensive arms and services Taiwan needs, including Patriot-type air defense systems, and, I assure you, we will continue to help it meet its needs consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act. In the long-term, I remain convinced that reduction of tension in the Taiwan Strait depends on the continuing evolution of common interests between the people on Taiwan and the people in the People's Republic of China. Only through the steady development of confidence and trust between Taipei and Beijing can we expect a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue on terms acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait. I made these points in unequivocal terms to Premier Zhu.

You also raised China's military modernization and allegations of Chinese clandestine efforts to obtain sensitive U.S. technology. I agree that this is a

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serious matter. We are under no illusions about efforts by China to obtain sensitive information from us and we work hard to ensure that our national security is protected against such efforts. For instance, the United States does not export weapons to China, nor does the U.S. Government approve exports of controlled dual-use items to the People's Liberation Army or the police. One of the agreements we reached with China during my visit last summer was to allow previously unobtainable post-shipment verification checks of exports to civilian end-users to assure they are used as intended. We will continue to enhance the effectiveness of our post-shipment verification system.

With regard to Chinese espionage at U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories, I take this threat seriously and am determined to take all steps necessary to protect sensitive national security information. I acted quickly to evaluate the information and develop new procedures to strengthen security at the nuclear weapons labs, promulgating a sweeping Presidential Decision Directive in February 1998. I also asked the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, chaired by Warren Rudman, to do a comprehensive assessment of the counterintelligence threat at the national labs and the adequacy of measures put in place to counter this threat, and to deliver their report to Congress. In its excellent report, the PFIAB, concluded that the Administration has undertaken far-reaching reforms in addressing systemic problems at the national labs, though it also recommended additional reforms, which we are evaluating. The final point I would make is that during his April visit, I told Premier Zhu that espionage or other efforts to circumvent our technology transfer laws were unacceptable.

We have worked hard, and successfully, to improve Chinese conduct on non-proliferation. The Administration has gained China's agreement to:

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- * sign and submit for ratification the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- * cease all cooperation with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities;
- * engage in no new nuclear cooperation with Iran, including for peaceful purposes;
- * provide no more C-801/802 anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran;
- * promulgate national nuclear export laws and regulations controlling export of dual-use items with nuclear applications;
- * sign the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- * commit to improve verification and implementation provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention.

More remains to be done. We will continue to urge the Chinese to tighten further their controls on export of missile technology and are urging them take the steps necessary for eligibility in the Missile Technology Control Regime.

On human rights, we continue to have significant differences with China, which I raised with Premier Zhu during his April visit. My Administration has been very clear, publicly and privately, in condemning the arrests and convictions of pro-democracy activists. We will continue to call attention to such human rights abuses, something we have done most recently through our resolution on China at the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva. We will also endeavor to sustain both official and unofficial dialogues with China on a broad range of human rights issues.

I also raised the subject of Tibet with Premier Zhu. We will keep working to promote a dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama, and will stress the importance of respect for Tibet's cultural and religious heritage.

There will continue to be challenges in our bilateral relationship with China, not the least of which has been the May 7 accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and its aftermath. My Administration remains committed to overcome these challenges in ways that protect and advance the interests of the

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American people. Under Secretary Pickering's June 16 explanation of the accidental bombing to the Chinese leadership in Beijing should put us on the path toward a more positive agenda in our relationship. In this and other areas, we will continue our efforts to get the Chinese to address advancing our relationship in ways that promote U.S. interests.

In particular, we are seeking to open China's market to American exports, build a more reciprocal trade relationship, promote the rule of law in China, and accelerate China's integration into the world economy by concluding a strong deal with China on its accession to the World Trade Organization. We will be consulting closely with the Congress as these efforts progress. Our goal remains to conclude a commercially sound deal with China this year.

Thank you again for writing. I appreciate your concerns and intend to continue working with the Congress to promote U.S. national interests in our relationship with China.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Cass Ballenger
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3310

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/8/99 9:33:43 AM
FROM Keith, James R. (ASIA)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Congressional Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO McCarthy, Mary O. (INTEL)

CARBON_COPY Tucker, Maureen E. (NONPRO)

TEXT_BODY

Mary: latest version of a letter you cleared some weeks ago--still trying to get it out. Jim

-----Original Message-----

From: Rudman,
Mara E. (CNSLR)
Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 1999 10:39 AM
To: Samore,
Gary S. (NONPRO)
Cc: Keith, James R. (ASIA); @RUDMAN
Subject: FW:
Congressional Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Gary (and
Jim):

I'd stay away from making 96/97 distinctions that also force us to characterize one or the other brief -- particularly in a letter like this that will have widespread distribution. For same reason, i would include the date of PDD 61 without flagging the "long before it received public attention" because I think some of the letter recipients will (rightly) take it as a tweak at them which, however deserved, we should try to avoid.

-----Original Message-----

From: Samore,
Gary S. (NONPRO)
Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 1999 9:48 AM
To: Keith,
James R. (ASIA)
Cc: Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO); @RUDMAN; @ASIA -
Asian Affairs
Subject: FW: Congressional Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]

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Importance: High

Good.
letter. Couple of comments.

-----Original Message-----

From: Keith,
James R. (ASIA)
Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 1999 8:46 AM
To: Samore,
Gary S. (NONPRO)
Cc: @NONPRO - Export Controls; @RUDMAN; @LEGISLAT
- Legislative Affairs
Subject: Congressional Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

SRB

asked that you and Mara take a close look at the re-write of a letter that has been bouncing around for months. Text below includes Mara's final edits. I'm ready to send this back to the front office as soon as you review for a last time. I'll send down to you a copy of SRB's note and the incoming. Incoming is from Rep. Sweeny and 48 additional members. Jim

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2403RedoPOTUSltr 1.doc

Dear Representative Ballenger:

Thank you for your letter regarding U.S. policy toward China and suggestions as to how we should proceed in our bilateral relationship.

Our policy toward China is realistic and based on what is in our nation's best interest. Our policy of purposeful engagement has led to real progress on

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matters of vital interest to the United States, such as non-proliferation, stability on the Korean peninsula and management of the Asian financial crisis.

With respect to the specific points you raised in your letter, Premier Zhu and I spent a great deal of time discussing the subject of regional economic security. Regarding the territorial claims in the South China Sea, I assure you that all contestants, including the Chinese, are well aware of our continuing interest in peaceful resolution of differences over the Spratly Islands through dialogue.

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There will continue to be challenges in our bilateral relationship with China, not the least of which has been the May 7 accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and its aftermath. My Administration remains committed to overcome these challenges in ways that protect and advance the interests of the American people. Under Secretary Pickering's June 16 explanation of the accidental bombing to the Chinese leadership in Beijing should put us on the path toward a more positive agenda in our relationship. In this and other

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areas, we
will continue our efforts to get the Chinese to address advancing our
relationship in ways that promote U.S. interests.

In particular, we are seeking to open China's market to American
exports, build a
more reciprocal trade relationship, promote the rule of law in China,
and
accelerate China's integration into the world economy by concluding a
strong deal
with China on its accession to the World Trade Organization. We will
be
consulting closely with the Congress as these efforts progress. Our
goal remains
to conclude a commercially sound deal with China this year.

Thank you again for writing. I appreciate your concerns and intend to
continue
working with the Congress to promote U.S. national interests in our
relationship
with China.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Cass Ballenger
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3310

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/15/99 8:28:22 PM
FROM Rudman, Mara E. (CNSLR)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: china paragraph [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Sutphen, Mona K. (NSA)
Gray, Wendy E. (SPCHW/CNSLR)
Rudman, Mara E. (CNSLR)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

Mona--

Thanks. I was working on it in Baltimore yesterday but didn't get as far as you have here. The one point which I think is good but on which I'm a little squeamish, and you should get Miles' reaction -- is the "implementing PFIAB recs" line. I tried to walk it back a little. While we all know we'll get there, not clear whether DOE will have finally and formally signed off before this letter reaches the Hill -- and they would kill us if this letter was flaunted about indicating Administration was not backing them up....

Miles

-- have I walked it back enough to give us sufficient room but still show we are moving toward the PFIAB reforms?

-----Original Message-----

From: Sutphen,
Mona K. (NSA)

Sent: Thursday, July 15, 1999 3:40 PM

To: @RUDMAN;

Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)

Subject: china paragraph [UNCLASSIFIED]

Mara

I know you're really swamped, so I took a hand at redrafting the China espionage-related paragraph in the Sweeny letter. It now reads:

"With regard to Chinese espionage at U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories, I can assure you I take this threat very seriously.

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In April 1996 when I learned about possible compromise of sensitive weapons information, we took immediate steps in response. Both the House and Senate intelligence committees were briefed, the FBI launched a formal investigation and the Department of Energy stepped-up its efforts to develop procedures to strengthen security at the nuclear weapons labs. These efforts culminated in the promulgation of a sweeping Presidential Decision Directive, which I signed in February 1998. More recently, I also asked the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), chaired by Warren Rudman, to do a comprehensive assessment of the counterintelligence threat at the national labs and the adequacy of measures put in place to counter this threat. The PFIAB concluded that the Administration has taken far-reaching reforms in addressing systemic security problems at our weapons labs. We are working closely and constructively with Congress on evaluating the report and assessing how best to implement several additional reforms it proposes. Finally, during his April visit, I told Premier Zhu that espionage or other efforts to circumvent our technology transfer laws were unacceptable."

Let me know what you think. Thanks.

Mona

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